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ABSTRACT 
The discussion whether an international arbitrator’s mandate 
includes the facilitation of settlement between the parties is not new. 
For the past decades, it has unfolded between those who believe in 
settlement facilitation as an efficient means to end the parties’ dispute 
and those who consider such activities incompatible with the 
arbitrator’s judicial role as a “private judge.” Up to now, this 
discussion has remained deeply rooted in domestic conceptions of 
what the arbitrator’s role should and should not be. This Article 
argues that it is past time to throw these culturally shaped beliefs 
overboard. In the interest of the much-debated quest for increased 
efficiency in the arbitral process, international arbitrators should 
realize and appreciate that settlement facilitation is not incompatible 
with their mandate and can be a highly useful tool to resolve the 
parties’ dispute in a time- and cost-efficient manner. To further this 
understanding of the arbitrator’s mandate, this Article offers tried and 
tested tools that allow international arbitrators to facilitate settlement 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Procedural efficiency,” “case management,” and “proactivity” – 
these buzz words currently dominate the realm of international 
arbitration. Most stakeholders have realized that a considerable 
decrease of the time and costs an international arbitration requires is 
vital to its future success. There is widespread agreement that crucial 
to ensuring procedural efficiency is a decisive and proactive arbitral 
tribunal.1 There is less agreement regarding another important means 
of increasing efficiency: settlement facilitation by the arbitrator. 
Whether an arbitrator can and should take a proactive approach 
and get involved in the parties’ settlement efforts has been the subject 
of a controversial debate throughout the past decades.2 To a large 
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1. Cf. Klaus Peter Berger & J. Ole Jensen, Due Process Paranoia and the Procedural 
Judgment Rule: A Safe Harbour for Procedural Management Decisions by International 
Arbitrators, 32 ARB. INT’L 415, 416 (2016) with further references. 
2. See generally Michael E. Schneider, Combining Arbitration with Conciliation, in 
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
CULTURE 57–100 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 1998); Michael Hwang, The Role of 
Arbitrators as Settlement Facilitators – Commentary, in NEW HORIZONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND BEYOND 571–81 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2005); Pierre 
Lalive, The Role of Arbitrators as Settlement Facilitators – A Swiss View, in NEW HORIZONS 
IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND BEYOND 556–64 (Albert Jan van den 
Berg ed., 2005); Fali S. Nariman, The Role of Arbitrators as Settlement Facilitators – 
Introduction, in NEW HORIZONS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND 
BEYOND 531–32 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2005); Arthur L. Mariott, Arbitrators and 
Settlement, in NEW HORIZONS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND BEYOND 
533–46 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2005); Christian Bühring-Uhle, Gabriele Scherer & Lars 
Kirchhoff, The Arbitrator as Mediator, in TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 135–43 (Christopher R. Drahozal & 
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extent, this debate has not yielded definitive answers. At its core lie 
differing perceptions of the arbitrator’s mandate. Is his or her role 
limited to deciding the parties’ dispute by rendering an award or 
should he or she endeavor to resolve it, which may include getting 
involved in settlement discussions between the parties? The answer to 
that question still markedly depends on the legal backgrounds of those 
who participate in the debate. While common law arbitrators are more 
inclined to view their role solely as decision-makers, lawyers with a 
civil law background follow a more liberal approach and advocate a 
proactive arbitral role in the parties’ settlement attempts.3 
Historically, such clashes of the civil law and common law 
traditions have existed in many areas of international arbitration. 
                                                                                                             
Richard W. Naimark eds., 2005); Judith Gill, The Arbitrator’s Role in Bringing About a 
Settlement – An English View, in BEST PRACTICES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 155–65 
(2006); Bernd Ehle, The Arbitrator as a Settlement Facilitator, in WALKING A THIN LINE: 
WHAT AN ARBITRATOR CAN DO, MUST DO OR MUST NOT DO 79–95 (2010); Christopher 
Harris, Arbitrators and Settlement – A Common Law Perspective, in THE ARBITRATORS’ 
INITIATIVE: WHEN, WHY, AND HOW SHOULD IT BE USED? 89–98 (Domitille Baizeau & Frank 
Spoorenberg eds., 2016); Paolo Marzolini, The Arbitrator as a Dispute Manager – The 
Exercise of the Arbitrator’s Powers to Act as Settlement Facilitator, in THE ARBITRATORS’ 
INITIATIVE: WHEN, WHY, AND HOW SHOULD IT BE USED? 99–119 (Domitille Baizeau & 
Frank Spoorenberg eds., 2016); Thomas Stipanowich & Zachary P. Ulrich, Commercial 
Arbitration and Settlement: Empirical Insights into the Roles Arbitrators Play, PENN ST. 
YEARBOOK ON ARB. AND MEDIATION 1–31 (6 ed. 2014);  Harold I. Abramson, Protocols for 
International Arbitrators Who Dare to Settle Cases, 10 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1–17 (1999); 
Christopher Koch & Erik Schäfer, Can It Be Sinful for an Arbitrator Actively to Promote 
Settlement?, ARB. DISP. RES. L.J. 153–84 (1999); Michael Collins, Do International Arbitral 
Tribunals have any Obligations to Encourage Settlement of the Disputes Before Them?, 19 
ARB. INT’L 333–43 (2003); Hilmar Raeschke-Kessler, The Arbitrator as Settlement 
Facilitator, 21 ARB. INT’L 523–36 (2005); Daniele Favalli & Max K. Hasenclever, The Role of 
Arbitrators in Settlement Proceedings, 23 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 21–30 (2008); Renate 
Dendorfer, Aktives Vergleichsmanagement – Best Practice oder Faux pas schiedsrichterlicher 
Tätigkeit?, GER. ARB. J. (SCHIEDSVZ) 276–83 (2009); Ugo Draetta, Leveraging the Arbitral 
Process to Encourage Settlement: Some Practical and Legal Issues, INT’L BUS. L.J. 487–96 
(2009); Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, When Arbitrators Facilitate Settlement: Towards a 
Transnational Standard, 25 ARB. INT’L 187–205 (2009); Lucy Greenwood, A Window of 
Opportunity? Building a Short Period of Time into Arbitral Rules in Order for Parties to 
Explore Settlement, 27 ARB. INT’L 199–210 (2011); Sophie Nappert & Dieter Flader, A 
Psychological Perspective on the Facilitation of Settlement in Int’l Arb. – Examining the 
CEDR Rules, 2 J. INT’L DISP. SETT. 459–70 (2011); Klaus Peter Berger, Promoting 
Settlements in Arb.: Is the “German Approach” Really Incompatible with the Role of the 
Arbitrator?, 9 NY DISP. RES. L. 46–49 (2016); Miloš Olík & Michal Čáp, Comparison of 
Settlement Efforts by Arbitrators and Mediators, 82 INT’L J. of ARB., MEDIATION, AND DISP. 
MGMT. 250–53 (2016). 
3.  Cf. JOSHUA KARTON, THE CULTURE OF INT’L ARB. AND THE EVOLUTION OF 
CONTRACT LAW 196 (2013); Siegfried H. Elsing, Procedural Efficiency in Int’l Arb.: 
Choosing the Best of Both Legal Worlds, GER. ARB. J. (SCHIEDSVZ) 114, 117 (2011). 
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Today, in a world in which all stakeholders have realized and 
accepted the need for efficiency and predictability, most of these 
clashes have been resolved in a more or less pragmatic fashion.4 
Instead of the legal background influencing an arbitrator’s procedural 
conduct, there is an “increasing convergence of approaches used by 
chairpersons in international arbitration [which] increases the 
predictability of the international arbitral process.”5 Indeed, it can be 
considered a hallmark of the modern international arbitrator that he or 
she is able to adopt different styles of procedural conduct, depending 
on the specificities and intricacies of the case: “By drawing on a 
variety of legal traditions but wedding themselves to none, truly 
transnational arbitrators can promote the effective resolution of 
disputes by offering unique procedural solutions tailored to the 
parties’ needs.”6 
There is no reason why settlement facilitation by international 
arbitrators should be an exception. This Article argues that what 
should guide the arbitrator who is faced with the question whether to 
facilitate settlement between the parties are not his or her legal 
upbringing and cultural convictions. Neither should misconceptions 
about what settlement facilitation actually is deter arbitrators from 
exploring that option.7 Rather, the arbitrator should solely be guided 
by what the parties and the intricacies of the case require. Recent 
surveys and developments indicate that parties in many cases require 
their arbitrators to facilitate settlement between them.8 This Article 
advocates that this need should not be discarded as incompatible with 
the arbitrator’s mandate. Rather, it is compatible with the arbitrator’s 
judicial role as a decision-maker that he can get involved in 
settlement discussions with the parties.9 By elaborating on the 
                                                                                                             
4. A prominent example is the success of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in 
International Commercial Arbitration 2010. INT’L BAR ASS’N [“IBA”], IBA RULES ON THE 
TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2010), available at 
http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx. 
5. Albert Jan van den Berg, Organizing an International Arbitration: Practice Pointers, 
in LEADING ARBITRATORS’ GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 415 (Lawrence W. 
Newman & Richard D. Hill eds., 3d ed. 2014). 
6. Donald Francis Donovan, The International Arbitrator as Transnational Judge, 7 
WORLD ARB. & MED. REV. 193, 198 (2013); cf. Klaus Peter Berger, The International 
Arbitrator’s Dilemma: Transnational Procedure versus Home Jurisdiction – A German 
Perspective, 25 ARB. INT’L 217–38 (2009). 
7. See infra Part II.  
8. See infra Part III.  
9. See infra Part IV.  
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approaches currently employed in practice, this Article offers the 
transnational arbitrator tried and tested procedural tools to enhance 
the efficiency of international arbitration by facilitating settlement 
between the parties.10 
II.  TO ENCOURAGE, PROMOTE OR FACILITATE SETTLEMENT? 
THE ARBITRATOR ROLE CONTINUUM 
To a considerable extent, the debate regarding the arbitrator’s 
role in parties’ settlement efforts can be traced back to inconsistent 
terminology and fundamental misunderstandings.11 The terms “to 
encourage,” “to promote,” and “to facilitate” settlement are often used 
interchangeably.12 At other times, they are used to indicate differing 
degrees of arbitral involvement in the parties’ settlement 
discussions.13 Such terminological ambiguity acts as a catalyst for the 
ongoing controversial debate. If there is no uniform understanding of 
what settlement facilitation is and means, there is a danger that any 
discussion about this issue results in little more than two ships passing 
in the night. This makes it imperative to develop a clear 
understanding of the differing degrees of arbitrator involvement in the 
parties’ settlement efforts before moving on to discussing its details. 
However, rather than getting hung up in abstract definitions, the focus 
should be on what it is that international arbitrators do or can do in 
their attempts to help the parties settle the case. 
A similarly pragmatic approach has been suggested to avoid 
misunderstandings caused by the use of different terminology in the 
context of international business mediation.14 While some strictly 
distinguish between “facilitative,” “evaluative,” and “transformative” 
mediation styles, others emphasize the “nature of mediation as a fluid 
and dynamic process.”15 To avoid such terminological quarrels, it has 
                                                                                                             
10. See infra Part V.  
11. Cf. Ehle, supra note 2, at 83; Berger, The International Arbitrator’s Dilemma, supra 
note 6, at 223; Berger, Promoting Settlements in Arb., supra note 2, at 46. 
12. Cf. Mariott, supra note 2, at 533–37; Ehle, supra note 2, at 79; Draetta, supra note 2, 
at 487-91; Berger, Promoting Settlements in Arb., supra note 2, at 46–47. 
13. See Hwang, supra note 2 at 572. 
14. Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediator’s Orientations, Strategies and 
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT L. REV. 7, 9 (1996) (“[A]lmost every 
conversation about mediation suffers from ambiguity, a confusion of the ‘is’ and the 
‘ought.’”).  
15. See generally KLAUS PETER BERGER, PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN INT’L BUS.: 
NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, ARB. 11–25 (3d ed. 2015).  
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been suggested to view the mediator’s role as a continuum.16 The 
mediator should not be chained to one particular style and adhere 
slavishly to an abstract role model, but should adopt a pragmatic 
approach. He or she should be ready to take the role of a facilitative, 
evaluative or transformative mediator, or adopt a blend of these 
styles, depending on what the parties and the dispute require.17 
Applied to international arbitration, the arbitrator’s role in the 
parties’ settlement efforts may also be viewed as a continuum – a 
spectrum of how far the arbitrator becomes involved in the parties’ 
settlement efforts. At one end of that arbitrator role continuum is the 
lowest possible degree of involvement: none. A large number of 
arbitrators, especially from the common law world, believe that they 
should not even mention the possibility of settlement to the parties, let 
alone become involved in any meaningful way. They perceive it as 
belittlement to tell sophisticated commercial parties, who will likely 
have considered their options beforehand, that they are free to settle 
the dispute.18 In their opinion, the fact that parties initiate an 
international arbitration means that they want a binding decision on 
their dispute.19 If anything, these arbitrators assume that the parties 
will take up the issue of settlement among themselves outside the 
hearing room, without the need for the arbitral tribunal to assist them 
in their efforts. 
The next step on the continuum is the arbitral tribunal’s abstract 
proposal that settlement may be an option. Section h(i) of Appendix 
IV to the ICC Rules 2017 suggests that arbitral tribunals inform the 
parties “that they are free to settle all or part of the dispute either by 
negotiation or through any form of amicable dispute resolution 
methods.”20 Most international arbitrators seem to accept this as part 
                                                                                                             
16. Riskin, supra note 14, at 44.  
17. See id. at 44-45; cf CHRISTIAN DUVE, HORST EIDENMÜLLER & ANDREAS HACKE, 
MEDIATION IN DER WIRTSCHAFT 88 (2d ed. 2011).  
18.  KARTON, supra note 3, at 106 (discussing reports of English and Australian 
arbitrators who state this as the reason why they are reluctant to mention settlement at all). 
19. Cf. id. at 106 (quoting an Australian arbitrator: “International arbitration is expensive 
and time consuming. Invariably, the parties try to negotiate. It would be outstanding if they 
didn’t try to negotiate. Arbitrations are a last resort. It’s pretty naïve to say to the parties, ‘Have 
you considered trying to resolve this amicably?’ You know they got big law firms involved. Of 
course they know the ropes. It is very, very occasionally appropriate to say something.”).  
20.  App. IV, Sec. h (i), Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, 
in force as from 1 March 2017, in  ICC, ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION RULES 62, 63 
(2017); see also ICC COMM’N ON ARB. AND ADR, TECHNIQUES FOR CONTROLLING TIME 
AND COSTS IN ARB. 11 (2d ed. 2012); THE AAA CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN 
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of their mandate.21 Indeed, there is little that would speak against 
simply informing the parties that they might consider settling the 
case. On the other hand, this information alone may not go a long 
way to actually encourage settlement. As indicated above, parties will 
almost always be aware of the option to negotiate a settlement. 
The part of the continuum where the arbitral tribunal actually 
contributes in a meaningful way is laid out in Section h(ii) of 
Appendix IV to the ICC Rules 2017, which states that “where agreed 
between the parties and the arbitral tribunal, the arbitral tribunal may 
take steps to facilitate settlement of the dispute.”22 This provision 
acknowledges the intrinsic value of facilitating settlement between the 
parties. However, it does not provide any concrete examples of what 
these “steps to facilitate settlement” may look like. One of those steps 
is provided for in Article 2(3)(a) IBA Rules of Evidence 2010: “The 
Arbitral Tribunal is encouraged to identify to the Parties . . . any 
issues that the Arbitral Tribunal may regard as relevant to the case 
and material to its outcome.” Such an early evaluation can be an 
important step to stimulate settlement between the parties as they 
realize their chances to succeed in the arbitration. 
Another step further on the continuum is for the arbitral tribunal 
to conduct a full-fledged settlement conference with the parties. The 
Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution (“CEDR”), an independent 
British commercial ADR provider, has published a helpful soft-law 
instrument in that regard. The CEDR Rules for the Facilitation of 
Settlement in International Arbitration 2009 (“CEDR Rules”)23 clarify 
that in a settlement conference, the arbitral tribunal not only discusses 
the chances of a possible settlement with the parties, but also its 
                                                                                                             
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, Canon IV.F  (2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/dispute/commercial_disputes.authcheckdam.pdf.  
21. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 2, at 188; Draetta, supra note 2, at 493; cf. Matthias 
Pitkowitz & Marie-Therese Richter, May a Neutral Third Person Serve as Arbitrator and 
Mediator in the Same Dispute? 225–30, 227, GER. ARB. J. (SCHIEDSVZ) (2009); cf. OLIVER 
FROITZHEIM, DIE ABLEHNUNG VON SCHIEDSRICHTERN WEGEN BEFANGENHEIT IN DER 
INTERNATIONALEN SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT 666 (2016).  
22. See ARB. RULES OF THE GERMAN INSTITUTION OF ARB. Section 32.1 (1998) (“At 
every stage of the proceedings, the arbitral tribunal should seek to encourage an amicable 
settlement of the dispute or of individual issues in dispute”); see also, COURT OF INNOVATIVE 
ARB. RULES. Art. 13.4 (2015) (“After consulting the parties and if neither party objects, the 
Arbitrator is authorized to attempt to bring about a settlement to the dispute”).  
23.  CEDR RULES FOR THE FACILITATION OF SETTLEMENT IN INT’L ARB. Art. 5 (1.1)-
(1.4) (2009), available at https://www.cedr.com/about_us/arbitration_commission/Rules.pdf. 
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potential contents.24 The arbitral tribunal thus becomes immediately 
involved with the parties’ settlement efforts and discusses with them 
in a dialectic manner how the case is best to be settled. 
Finally, on the far end of the continuum, there is caucusing. The 
practice of caucusing involves separate meetings by the arbitral 
tribunal with each party in order to get a better understanding of the 
background of the dispute and the parties’ respective interests, thus 
increasing the options for settlement.25 This approach is gleaned from 
mediation practice and is intended to “overcome the ‘negotiator’s 
dilemma’, which makes parties withhold information because they 
cannot be sure that the other side does not behave 
opportunistically.”26 While potentially very effective, such caucusing, 
when used in arbitration, raises important due process issues in regard 
to the parties’ right to be heard and the prohibition of ex parte 
communications with the arbitral tribunal.27 
It is here where the lines between arbitration and mediation start 
to blur. Parties may have Kafkaesque feelings about an arbitration-
turned-mediation without them becoming entirely aware of it at the 
time.28 To avoid any confusion, the use of mediation techniques in the 
arbitration must be strictly distinguished from ADR proceedings 
which are conducted separately from the arbitration. Such separate 
proceedings may take place before, during or after the arbitration. 
If they are conducted before the arbitration the entire process is 
often referred to as “Med-Arb.”29 Under the “Med-Arb” approach, 
arbitration is only initiated if the prior mediation has not led to a 
settlement between the parties. If the parties have so agreed, the same 
individual that has acted as mediator may then also act as arbitrator in 
                                                                                                             
24. Id. at art. 5 (1.3). 
25. Schneider, supra note 2, at 90.  
26. BERGER, PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION supra note 15, at 12–3.  
27. See infra Section V.D.  
28. Such transformations of the arbitral process into an entirely different process like 
mediation or conciliation mainly happen in Chinese arbitrations, see CHINA INT’L ECON. AND 
TRADE ARB. COMM’N  ARB. RULES Art. 41.1 (2015), (“With the consents of both parties, the 
arbitral tribunal may conciliate the case in a manner it considers appropriate.”) See also 
Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 2 at 196.  
29. See Dona Ross, Med-Arb/Arb-Med: A More Efficient ADR-Process or an Invitation 
to a Potential Ethical Disaster?, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2012 352, 359 (Arthur W. Rovine 
ed., 2013); Edna Sussman, Developing an Effective Med-Arb/Arb-Med Process, 2 NY DISP. 
RES. L. 71, 72 (2009). 
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the subsequent arbitration.30 Nevertheless, the proceedings remain 
formally separate and the arbitration constitutes an entirely new 
process. Similarly, some arbitration laws explicitly allow the arbitral 
tribunal to conduct mediation or conciliation during the arbitration, 
provided the parties consent.31 Article 5(3.1) of the CEDR Rules 
clarifies that for that purpose “[t]he Arbitral Tribunal shall insert a 
Mediation Window in the arbitral proceedings,” resulting in what is 
often referred to as “Arb-Med-Arb.”32 Even though these proceedings 
are conducted during the arbitration and sometimes by the same 
individuals that are serving as arbitrators—which, in itself may pose 
considerable problems—such dispute resolution processes are strictly 
separate from the arbitration. The same is true for ADR proceedings 
conducted after the arbitration. In processes like “Arb-Med”33 the 
arbitration ends with a non-binding award, giving the parties a basis 
to negotiate a settlement in subsequent mediation proceedings. 
Contrary to such separate proceedings, this Article focuses on 
what an arbitral tribunal may legitimately do in an arbitration without 
changing the process into something else. For the present purposes, 
“settlement facilitation” shall refer to any aspect on the arbitrator role 
continuum, from mentioning the possibility of settlement in an 
abstract way to conducting caucus sessions. 
III.  A GROWING USER APPETITE FOR SETTLEMENT 
FACILITATION IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
It is a truism that international arbitration provides the parties 
with the freedom to tailor the proceedings to their specific needs and 
to select arbitrators accordingly. Sociological studies have found that, 
for a long time, parties have not exercised this freedom in terms of 
                                                                                                             
30. BERGER, PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION supra note 15 at 15-11. 
31. See, e.g., Arbitration Ordinance, (2014) Cap. 609, 13, Section 33(1) (H.K.) (“If all 
parties consent in writing, and for so long as no party withdraws the party’s consent in writing, 
an arbitrator may act as a mediator after the arbitral proceedings have commenced.”); 
Singapore International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A, 1994), Section 17(1); The Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act, 1996, No. 26 of 1996 (India), Section 30(1) (“[W]ith the agreement of the 
parties, the arbitral tribunal may use mediation, conciliation or other procedures at any time 
during the arbitral proceedings to encourage settlement.”).  
32. See Dilyara Nigmatullina, The Combined Use of Mediation and Arbitration in 
Commercial Dispute Resolution: Results from an International Study, 33 J. INT’L ARB. 37 
(2016). 
33. See Ross, Med-Arb/Arb-Med, supra note 29; cf. Stipanowich & Ulrich, supra note 2, 
at 10, 25–28. 
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appointing arbitrators specifically for their settlement facilitation 
skills.34 In these studies, whether the arbitrator had the “[a]bility to 
encourage settlement between the parties” was seen as one of the least 
relevant criteria for arbitrator selection.35 That data has supported the 
traditional common law view that arbitrators should be reluctant to 
get involved in the parties’ settlement efforts.36 Today, it appears 
more difficult for opponents of settlement facilitation to rely on 
empirical data. Indeed, newer data suggests that parties’ selection 
patterns have significantly changed over the past years. The 
candidate’s approach to settlement facilitation and his or her abilities 
in this regard have become an important aspect in the selection 
process of arbitrators.37 
The reasons for this change are connected to a global shift in 
how parties to international commercial contracts prefer to resolve 
their disputes. Historically, the growth and success which arbitration 
has witnessed since the 1960s was mainly caused by the procedural 
straightjackets, particularities and limits to party autonomy in 
domestic procedural laws. Because of these pitfalls, commercial 
parties regarded international arbitration as a highly attractive 
alternative to state court litigation. Today, the tide appears to be 
turning. Now that the “alternative” international arbitration has 
become the norm for cross-border disputes, the process is faced with 
ever increasing competition from other means of dispute resolution, 
such as negotiation, conciliation and mediation. These processes are 
                                                                                                             
34. Thomas Schultz & Robert Kovacs, The Rise of a Third Generation of Arbitrators? 
Fifteen Years after Dezalay and Garth, 28 ARB. INT’L 161, 167 (2012); cf. QUEEN MARY 
UNIVERSITY & WHITE & CASE, 2010 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: CHOICES IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 26 (2010), available at http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/
docs/123290.pdf (which does not mention the arbitrator’s approach to settlement facilitation as 
one of the “influences on choice of co-arbitrators”). 
35. Schultz & Kovacs, supra note 34 at 167. 
36. Cf. KARTON, supra note 3. See also Draetta, supra note 2, at 493; Siegfried H. 
Elsing, Procedural Efficiency in International Arbitration: Choosing the Best of Both Legal 
Worlds, GER. ARB. J. (SCHIEDS VZ) 114-23, 117-18 (2011); BORN, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, infra note 59, at 2007; FROITZHEIM, supra note 21, at 665; cf. 
McIlwrath, infra note 37, at 908. 
37. Ema Vidak-Gojkovic, Lucy Greenwood & Michael McIlwrath, Puppies or Kittens? 
How To Better Match Arbitrators to Party Expectations, in AUSTRIAN YEARBOOK ON 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2016 61, 64–65 (Christian Klausegger et al. eds., 2016); cf. 
Michael McIlwrath, Selecting Arbitrators for Commercial Oil & Gas Industry Arbitrations, in 
THE LEADING PRACTITIONERS’ GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL OIL & GAS ARBITRATION 901, 
908 (James M. Gaitis ed., 2015). 
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viable “alternatives to the alternative” and thus become increasingly 
attractive for the users of international arbitration.38 
The Global Pound Conference Series 2016-17 provides valuable 
insights in this regard.39 This series of more than thirty conferences 
across the globe asks its participants (commercial parties, counsel, 
arbitrators, mediators and other stakeholders) for their experience and 
needs regarding alternative dispute resolution. The result is an 
unprecedented set of data, indicating how parties to international 
commercial contracts prefer to resolve their disputes today and in the 
future. Once all conferences have been concluded, this data will be 
published as “The GPC Series Final Report” at the end of 2017. The 
conferences that have taken place in 2016 already indicate what the 
final results may look like.40 
In the seven conferences that have taken place in 2016,41 more 
than 600 stakeholders have answered important questions in regard to 
their dispute resolution preferences. One question they were asked is 
what role they want their dispute resolution providers (i.e. arbitrators, 
mediators and judges) to take.42 A clear majority answered that, while 
they initially do not have a preference, they “seek guidance from the 
providers regarding optimal ways of resolving their dispute” when 
such a dispute arises.43 This indicates that parties are in principle open 
to settlement suggestions beyond the specific dispute resolution 
process they are in at that moment. 
In terms of dispute resolution policies, the participants indicated 
that currently the most effective commercial dispute resolution 
                                                                                                             
38. Cf. Klaus Peter Berger & J. Ole Jensen, It Takes Pressure to Form Diamonds: The 
Changing Landscape of Dispute Resolution and Its Implications for International Arbitration, 
KLUWER ARB. BLOG (May 23, 2016), http://www.kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/05/23/. 
39. See GLOBAL POUND CONFERENCE, http://www.globalpoundconference.org 
[hereinafter GPC]. 
40. See Cumulated Data Results: March to December 2016, GLOBAL POUND 
CONFERENCE 2016-17, http://www.globalpoundconference.org/Documents/Aggregated%20
Data%20Report%20GPC_28Dec.pdf (showing the aggregated results of 2016). 
41. The conferences that have taken place in 2016 were the GPCs in Singapore (March 
17-18, 2016), Lagos (June 30, 2016), Mexico City (August 29, 2016), New York (September 
12, 2016), Geneva (September 29, 2016), Toronto (October 15, 2016) and Madrid (October 
20, 2016).  
42. See GPC, supra note 39, at 13. Session 1, Question 4: “What role do parties involved 
in commercial disputes want providers to take in the dispute resolution processes?”  
43. Id. That option received a total popularity ranking of 63%, followed by “[t]he 
providers decide on the process and the parties decide how the dispute is resolved” (38%) and 
“[t]he parties decide how the process is conducted and how the dispute is resolved (the 
providers just assist)” (34%).  
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processes were those that combined adjudicative with non-
adjudicative elements.44 This indicates a growing user-interest in 
settling disputes during adversarial proceedings in an amicable way, 
ideally with the assistance of the adjudicator. In line with that, there 
was a clear majority who thought that “[g]reater emphasis on 
collaborative instead of adversarial processes for resolving disputes” 
is going to have the most significant influence on the future of dispute 
resolution.45 Looking at the combination of these results, it becomes 
clear that parties increasingly seek dispute resolution methods that are 
not purely adversarial. Rather, they appreciate the possibility of 
combining adjudicatory with non-adjudicatory mechanisms. 
This trend is also reflected in the growing number of escalation 
or multi-tier (“cascade”) dispute resolution clauses that are being 
included into international commercial contracts.46 These clauses 
foresee the mandatory completion of a negotiation and/or mediation 
stage before arbitration proceedings may be initiated. Their purpose is 
that only a very limited number of disputes arising between the 
parties remain to be settled in adversarial arbitration proceedings, 
while the majority of them will have been settled amicably without 
the need to initiate arbitration. 
Two other surveys indicate that parties may be increasingly 
interested in arbitrators with the skill to facilitate settlement. The first 
was conducted with more than 200 internationally active US 
arbitrators.47 It indicates that throughout the past five to ten years, the 
number of cases settled in the course of international arbitrations has 
been increasing significantly.48 Thus, there is a clear trend to seek a 
collaborative solution to disputes even if they have already resulted in 
adversarial proceedings. The second survey involved in-house 
counsel of Fortune 1,000 companies and concluded that saving time 
                                                                                                             
44. Id. That option received a popularity ranking of 57%. It was followed by the 
adoption of “[p]re-dispute or pre-escalation processes to prevent disputes” (42%) and “[n]on-
adjudicative dispute resolution methods (mediation or conciliation)” (39%). 
45. Id. at 104 (“What innovations/trends are going to have the most significant influence 
on the future of commercial dispute resolution?” That option received a total popularity 
ranking of 60%. It was followed by “[c]hanges in corporate attitudes to conflict prevention” 
(53%) and “[h]armonisation of international laws and standards for dispute resolution 
systems” (29%)). 
46. See Klaus Peter Berger, Law and Practice of Escalation Clauses, 22 ARB. INT’L 1 
(2006). 
47. Stipanowich & Ulrich, supra note 2, at 2. The survey was conducted by the College 
of Commercial Arbitrators and Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution in 2013. 
48. Id. at 17–18. 
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and money are the most important reasons why parties turn to 
alternative dispute resolution.49 While there are many ways in which 
time and money can be saved, settlement facilitation goes a long way 
towards that end. 
First and foremost, settlement facilitation provides efficiency to 
the resolution of the parties’ dispute. Instead of going through the 
entire process of an international arbitration, the parties conclude their 
dispute at an earlier stage, often after the taking of evidence. In 
addition, parties do not have to appoint a new individual to conduct a 
mediation to arrive at a settlement. Rather, arbitrators are already at 
the parties’ disposal and are familiar with the facts of the case as well 
as the commercial background of the dispute.50 Second, arbitrators are 
in a far better position than the parties to pick the right moment in 
which to provide settlement facilitation. While the parties can only 
choose unilaterally when to put that option on the table and often feel 
a disadvantage in the mere fact that they propose settlement, the 
arbitral tribunal can evaluate the right moment from a neutral 
perspective.51 Third, a settlement in the course of an arbitration 
provides security and predictability to the parties as the settlement 
contract may be turned into a consent award or award on agreed 
terms.52 Thus, the result parties take away from a collaborative 
resolution of their dispute is as enforceable as that of adversarial 
arbitral proceedings. Finally, if an ongoing business relationship is at 
stake, parties will in many cases prefer an amicable settlement over an 
adversarial outcome.53 This not only saves the short-term legal costs 
for conducting the arbitration, but may create large revenues in the 
medium and long term if parties can continue their business 
relationship. For these reasons, parties from civil law jurisdictions 
sometimes even expect the arbitral tribunal to suggest a reasonable 
                                                                                                             
49. Id. at 8 (“Respondents to a 2011 survey of corporate counsel in Fortune 1,000 
corporations identified each of the following goals as among the reasons companies choose 
ADR (alternative or appropriate dispute resolution) over litigation: saving time (70.9% of 
respondents); saving money (68.7%); allowing parties to resolve disputes themselves (52.4%); 
limiting discovery (51.5%); preserving privacy and confidentiality (46.8%); and preserving 
good relationships (43.5%). Each of these goals is likely to be effectively served—indeed, 
perhaps best served—by a negotiated settlement of disputes occurring as early as possible after 
a dispute arises.” [footnotes omitted]). 
50. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 2, at 197. 
51. Id. 
52. See id. at 197; see also Draetta, supra note 2, at 487. 
53. See Draetta, supra note 2, at 491; see also JEFFREY WAINCYMER, PROCEDURE AND 
EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 105 (2012). 
900 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:3 
settlement when the time is ripe.54 For them, there is no doubt that 
this is part of the arbitrator’s mandate. In China, for instance, 
approximately fifty percent of parties explicitly request settlement 
facilitation from the tribunal during their arbitration.55 
Globally, all of this indicates the parties’ growing appetite for 
more collaborative elements in the arbitral process.56 Parties from 
both civil and common law jurisdictions acknowledge the benefit of 
ending adversarial processes in an amicable way. Settlement 
facilitation provides an efficient, cost- and time-saving option to 
achieve that goal. Accordingly, many parties now require the skill 
from their arbitrator to be able to facilitate settlement between them.57 
If those parties do not find what they are looking for in international 
arbitration, there is a possibility that they will turn to other methods of 
ADR such as mediation or conciliation.58 
IV.  RECONCILING SETTLEMENT FACILITATION WITH THE 
ARBITRATOR’S JUDICIAL ROLE 
If parties require settlement facilitation, what is there to stop 
arbitrators from providing it? The answer to that question depends on 
one’s conceptual understanding of the arbitrator’s mandate. Today, it 
is largely undisputed that the arbitrator’s mandate has a hybrid 
nature.59 On the one hand, it is defined by the parties’ contract with 
the arbitrator (receptum arbitri) in which parties are free to shape the 
arbitrator’s mandate in any way they see fit. In that sense, the 
arbitrator is a service provider to the parties. On the other hand, the 
                                                                                                             
54. SIEGFRIED H. ELSING, ARBITRATION IN GERMANY 690–92 (Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, 
Stefan Michael Kröll, & Patricia Nacimiento eds., 2d ed. 2015). 
55. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 2, at 196. 
56. Stipanowich & Ulrich, supra note 2, at 28–29. 
57. See supra note 37.  
58. See Berger & Jensen, It Takes Pressure to Form Diamonds, supra note 38; cf. Fali S. 
Nariman, The Spirit of Arbitration: The Tenth Annual Goff Lecture, 16 ARB. INT’L 261, 267 
(2000) (“[U]ntil the resolution of a dispute by settlement is considered once again to be a 
constituent function of arbitration, ADR will take over and displace it as a pragmatic and 
workable alternative.”). 
59. JULIAN D. M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS & STEFAN M. KRÖLL, COMPARATIVE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 5-26 (2003) (“The mixed or hybrid theory has 
become the dominant world-wide theory as elements of both the jurisdictional and the 
contractual theory are found in modern law and practice of international commercial 
arbitration.”); cf. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1991 (2d ed. 
2014); FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
1122 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999).  
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arbitrator’s role also has a judicial dimension. Arbitrators perform a 
‘quasi-judicial’ function and must adhere to the mandatory rules of 
the applicable lex arbitri.60 The combination of these two aspects to 
the arbitral mandate make the international arbitrator a “private 
judge.”61 
In regard to settlement facilitation, some focus on the party 
autonomy aspect of the arbitrator’s mandate and consider that 
mandate to comprise anything that helps the parties to resolve their 
dispute.62 If parties are best served with a settlement conference, this 
is what the arbitrator will provide. The opponents of settlement 
facilitation have a narrower understanding of the arbitrator’s mandate 
and focus on its judicial side. They see it as the arbitrator’s sole task 
to decide the parties’ dispute, not to settle it.63 To them, arbitration is 
about winning and losing, not about discussing options for an 
amicable settlement. 
Conventional wisdom ascribes the latter view to the common 
law tradition.64 However, even some civil law jurists are convinced 
that “prodding parties towards settlement is not part of the arbitrators’ 
mandate.”65 If these voices acknowledge any arbitral role in 
settlement facilitation, it never extends beyond the very beginning of 
the arbitrator role continuum, i.e. proposing settlement to the parties 
in an abstract way.66 Anything beyond such a simple proposal is 
                                                                                                             
60. Cf. RG, Judgment of 29 November 1904 [1905] RGZ 59, 247, 249; Jivraj v. 
Hashwani [2011] UKSC 40, [para. 41] (appeal taken from EWCA). 
61. Cf. Jan Schäfer, The Arbitrator as a Private Judge, in WALKING A THIN LINE: WHAT 
AN ARBITRATOR CAN DO, MUST DO OR MUST NOT DO: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND 
TRENDS 19, 22 (Guy Keutgen ed., 2010). 
62. Ehle, supra note 2; cf. YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 40 n.17 (1996) (“Pierre Lalive . . . hardly ever decided a 
case. They would all be settled at some point. And that takes a lot of skill . . . from the 
chairman.”). 
63.  Hwang, supra note 2 at 571; Collins, supra note 2 at 343; cf. Abramson, supra note 
2 at 2. 
64. Draetta, supra note 2 at 493; Siegfried H. Elsing, Procedural Efficiency in 
International Arbitration: Choosing the Best of Both Legal Worlds, GER. ARB. J. (SCHIEDSVZ) 
114–23, 117–18 (2011); BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 59, 
at 2007; FROITZHEIM, supra note 21, at 665; cf. McIlwrath, supra note 37, at 908. 
65. Berlin event considers arbitrator and counsel ethics, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Oct. 17, 
2016), http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1069407/berlin-event-considers-
arbitrator-and-counsel-ethics. 
66. Collins, supra note 2, at 343; BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 
supra note 59, at 2006; Catherine A. Rogers & Jeffrey C. Jeng, The Ethics of International 
Arbitrators, in LEADING ARBITRATORS’ GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 175, 204–
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incompatible with their conception of the arbitrator’s mandate. To 
them, the arbitrator’s role as a private judge means that his or her 
mandate is limited to providing a binding decision on the parties’ 
dispute.67 
It is true that a final decision on the parties’ dispute is the 
arbitrator’s main and original mandate.68 However, contrary to the 
opponents of settlement facilitation, the arbitral mandate is not 
confined to decision-making. Even with a focus on the arbitrator’s 
judicial role, such a narrow understanding of that role does not reflect 
contemporary practice before most domestic courts around the world. 
Rather, a comparative analysis of different procedural laws indicates 
that it is an important aspect of the role of judges in many 
jurisdictions to facilitate settlement between litigating parties. This 
has traditionally been the case in jurisdictions of the “Germanic” 
background, i.e. Austria,69 Germany,70 and Switzerland71. It is also the 
approach of other civil law jurisdictions, such as Belgium,72 France,73 
Italy,74 and the Netherlands75. 
                                                                                                             
05 (Lawrence W. Newman & Richard D. Hill eds., 3d ed. 2014); cf. JEFFREY WAINCYMER, 
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 105 (2012). 
67. Cf. Stipanowich & Ulrich, supra note 2, at 6. 
68. Ulrich Theune, DIS Rules, in INSTITUTIONAL ARBITRATION: ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE 
COMMENTARY 203, 262 (Rolf A. Schütze ed., 2013); cf. PATRIK SCHÖLDSTRÖM, THE 
ARBITRATOR’S MANDATE 324 (1998); LEW, MISTELIS & KRÖLL, supra note 59, at 279; 
BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 59, at 1985. 
69. ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] Section 204(1), 
sentence 1 (Austria)  (“At the oral hearing, the court may, either at the request of a party or ex 
officio, attempt an amicable settlement of the entire dispute or certain aspects thereof.”). 
(authors’ translation). This provision applies to arbitrators by analogy. Cf. Ehle, supra note 2 at 
81; BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 59 at 2006. 
70. ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Section 278(1), 
translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_zpo/englisch_zpo.html (Ger.). (“At 
every stage of the proceedings, the court is to act in the interests of arriving at an amicable 
resolution of the legal dispute or of the individual points at issue.”). 
71. SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH [ZGB] [CIVIL CODE] Dec. 19, 2008, art. 197 
(Switz.) (“Litigation shall be preceded by an attempt at conciliation before a conciliation 
authority”.). 
72. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 731 (Belg.). 
73. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 21 (Fr.). (“To conciliate parties is part of the 
mandate of the judge.”). 
74. CODICE CIVILE [C.C.] art. 185 (It.). 
75.  DUTCH CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 87 (1) (“The court may, at the request of the 
parties or one of them or ex officio, in all cases and at any stage of the proceedings, order an 
appearance of the parties at the hearing in order to attempt a settlement.”) (authors’ 
translation). 
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However, most opponents of settlement facilitation in 
international arbitration fail to acknowledge that even in the main 
common law jurisdictions judges are now encouraged to facilitate 
settlement between the parties. In England and Wales, Section 1.4 (1) 
and (2)(f) of the Civil Procedure Rules (“CPR”) provides that the 
court must “help . . . the parties to settle the whole or part of the 
case.” In the United States, the efficacy of this approach has also been 
acknowledged: 
In this business-like system of civil procedure the tradition is 
strong that the court promotes compromise. The judge who 
gathers the facts soon knows the case as well as the litigants do, 
and he concentrates each subsequent increment of fact-gathering 
on the most important issues still unresolved.76 
Accordingly, US federal district judges are encouraged to 
facilitate settlement between the parties before them.77 In fact, state 
courts in many common law jurisdictions frequently facilitate 
settlement, which may go as far as conducting caucuses.78 Thus, the 
argument that settlement facilitation is incompatible with the 
arbitrator’s judicial role does not reflect judicial reality in many 
jurisdictions. Rather, it is a hallmark of civil procedure rules around 
the world that it is part of the judge’s mandate to help the parties 
before him or her to arrive at a settlement. 
Another concern some have in regard to settlement facilitation is 
that arbitrators might abdicate their mandate to decide the parties’ 
case by using settlement between the parties as a short cut.79 They 
fear that parties may feel coerced into settling even though they 
would prefer an award.80 Of course, arbitrators “should never give the 
impression to the parties that they are more interested in the parties 
engaging into a settlement agreement than they are to decide the 
dispute through a final award.”81 An arbitrator employing settlement 
facilitation as a way to enhance the efficiency of the proceedings must 
                                                                                                             
76. John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 
823–66, 831–32 (1985) (citations omitted). 
77. See D. MARIE PROVINE, SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES FOR FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES 
(1986); cf. DEZALAY AND GARTH, supra note 62, at 168 (“The [US] judge serves as a case 
manager [and] settlement adviser.”). 
78. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 2, at 191–92; cf. Harris, supra note 2, at 89. 
79. Hwang, supra note 2, at 572; Elsing, Procedural Efficiency in International 
Arbitration, supra note 64, at 118; Theune, supra note 68, at 262. 
80. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 2, at 200. 
81. ELSING, ARBITRATION IN GERMANY, supra note 54, at 2. 
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be very conscious of the parties’ wants and needs. Under no 
circumstances should the arbitrator force settlement negotiations upon 
parties who are not interested in them. But as long as the arbitral 
tribunal obtains the “informed consent” of the parties prior to taking 
any settlement facilitation measures,82 there is no room for the 
concern that the measure is forced upon them. In any case, this 
concern is met by the opposing observation that some arbitrators do 
not facilitate settlement simply because they cannot or do not want to 
sacrifice the hours of arbitrating that an early settlement would 
entail.83 
At the end of the day, whether settlement facilitation is 
compatible with the hybrid nature of the arbitrator’s mandate comes 
down to a simple question: where is the harm of providing it, if (a) 
this is what the parties want in a given case; (b) their legitimate 
expectations with respect to the scope of the tribunal’s initiative are 
met; and (c) their mandatory due process rights are preserved? Just as 
party autonomy allows the parties to tailor their dispute, the 
contractual nature of arbitration allows them to shape the arbitrator’s 
mandate. This makes the arbitrator’s mandate a flexible creature, to a 
large part defined by what parties want it to be. If the parties require 
active involvement by an arbitrator in their settlement efforts, 
settlement facilitation becomes part of the arbitrator’s mandate. 
Indeed, as party expectations change and develop,84 the general 
concept of the arbitrator’s mandate may evolve accordingly.85 In light 
of the civil procedure rules outlined above, it is not surprising that 
“there is generally no blanket prohibition even in [common law] 
systems against arbitrators proposing settlement of the parties’ 
dispute.”86 Quite to the contrary: 
Many arbitrators, arbitration practitioners and scholars are now 
recognizing that the traditional paradigm of the arbitrator as 
single-minded adjudicator must be refined to incorporate a 
broader concept of the arbitral role, including active case 
management at all stages of the proceeding, early resolution of 
                                                                                                             
82. Cf. IBA, IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 11 (2014) (“Informed consent by the parties to such a process prior to its 
beginning should be regarded as an effective waiver of a potential conflict of interest.”). 
83. Cf. Stipanowich & Ulrich, supra note 2, at 7. 
84. See supra Part III.  
85. Cf. Agrimex Ltd v Tradigrain SA [2003] EWHC 1656 (Comm), para 31. 
86. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 59, at 2007. 
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some or all issues, and activities that set the stage for 
settlement.87 
This broad understanding of the arbitrator’s judicial role is now 
acknowledged in many modern arbitration laws,88 arbitration rules89 
and soft law instruments90. These laws and rules explicitly endow the 
arbitral tribunal with the power to facilitate settlement, should the 
parties require it. Particularly noteworthy in this regard are the CEDR 
Rules, which provide a transnational standard and have already 
received a good amount of attention by commentators.91 Significant 
are also the changes made to the UNCITRAL Rules of Organizing 
Arbitral Proceedings. These Notes restate the current practice of 
conducting international arbitrations and reflect the views of the civil 
and common law practitioners who were part of the Working Group 
preparing the Notes. While the 1996 version of these Notes merely 
stated that “[a]ttitudes differ as to whether it is appropriate for the 
arbitral tribunal to bring up the possibility of settlement”,92 the 
updated 2016 version now acknowledges that “[i]n appropriate 
circumstances, the arbitral tribunal may raise the possibility of a 
                                                                                                             
87. Stipanowich & Ulrich, supra note 2, at 29; cf. Elsing, Procedural Efficiency in 
International Arbitration, supra note 64, at 118 (“Th[e] objections raised against the 
involvement of arbitrators in settlement attempts cannot, and must not, prevail over the 
obvious advantages that emphatic promotion of settlements brings, in particular, time and cost 
efficiency and greater acceptance by the parties.”). 
88.  The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, No. 26 of 1996 (India), Section 30(1) 
(“It is not incompatible with an arbitration agreement for an arbitral tribunal to encourage 
settlement of the dispute”); [Japanese Arbitration Law], Law No. 138 of 2003, art. 38(4) 
(Japan) (“An arbitral tribunal or one or more arbitrators designated by it may attempt to settle 
the civil dispute subject to the arbitral proceedings, if consented to by the parties”); Art. 1043 
Dutch Arbitration Law 2015 (“at any stage of the proceedings the arbitral tribunal may order 
the parties to appear in person for the purpose of attempting to arrive at a settlement”); the 
arbitration laws of Singapore and Hong Kong are to the same effect. See supra note 31. 
89. Schiedsgerichtsordnung [DIS] [Arbitration Rules], July 1, 1998, DIS Rules, Section 
32(1); Court of Innovative Arbitration [CoIA], October 1, 2015, CoIA Rules, Section 13(4). 
90. CEDR RULES; Canon IV (F) AAA CODE OF ETHICS 2004; Art. 8 IBA RULES OF 
ETHICS 1987.  
91. Cf. Nappert and Flader, supra note 2; Draetta, supra note 2, at 495 n.7; Ehle, supra 
note 2, at 86–87; Elsing, Procedural Efficiency in International Arbitration, supra note 64 at 
118; Greenwood, supra note 2, at 206–07; Stipanowich & Ulrich, supra note 2 at 1 fn 4; 
Andrey Panov & Sherina Petit, Amicable Settlement in International Arbitration, in THE 
EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN AND AFRICAN ARBITRATION REVIEW 2015 (GAR ed., 2015). 
92. UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL NOTES ON ORGANIZING ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS 1996 
12 para. 47 (1996), http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1996Notes_
proceedings.html. 
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settlement between the parties.”93 Though this is still a rather cautious 
approach, it reflects the general perception that the arbitrator’s 
judicial mandate is, in principle, compatible with becoming involved 
in the parties’ settlement efforts. 
In light of all these considerations, an arbitrator should no longer 
be viewed as a one-dimensional decision-maker. Rather: 
An arbitrator, is an arbitrator, is an arbitrator, whose function it 
is, not merely to adjudicate the dispute, but also to help resolve it 
amicably with the co-operation of the parties. . . . ‘Arbitration’ 
must never be considered as excluding from its purview the 
settlement of a dispute before the arbitrator: because this is of the 
essence of the spirit of arbitration.94 
Thus, whether arbitrators may facilitate settlement between the 
parties is not the decisive question anymore. The decisive question is 
how specifically international arbitrators may be involved while at the 
same time complying with the judicial part of their mandate to 
safeguard due process between the parties. This is what the following 
section is concerned with. 
V.  AVAILABLE TOOLS FOR THE FACILITATION OF 
SETTLEMENTS 
This last section will address certain methods and techniques 
international arbitrators can employ at different stages of the 
arbitration to facilitate settlement between the parties. Along the 
arbitrator role continuum,95 the present section will consider the 
concerns opponents of settlement facilitation may have regarding the 
parties’ due process rights. It is hoped that thus, regardless of their 
cultural background, international arbitrators will acknowledge that 
settlement facilitation can provide valuable efficiency without 
sacrificing due process. 
                                                                                                             
93. UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL NOTES ON ORGANIZING ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS 2016 
12 para. 72 (2016), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-notes/arb-notes-
2016-e-pre-release.pdf. 
94. Nariman, The Spirit of Arbitration, supra note 58, at 267 (emphasis in original). 
95. See supra Part II. 
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A.  Mentioning settlement to the parties 
Most arbitrators agree that, at any stage of the proceedings, they 
can suggest that the parties may attempt a settlement.96 For some 
arbitrators, this has become a routine question at the initial case 
management meeting. Arbitrators opposing even mentioning 
settlement at this stage of the proceedings assume that parties are 
sophisticated enough to negotiate a settlement without the arbitrator 
making them aware of that option.97 Their approach is based on the 
assumption that parties do not want to waste more time and money on 
settlement attempts. Rather, they seek a definitive outcome of their 
dispute. Neither will they be interested in saving their business 
relationship as they would not have initiated arbitration if that 
relationship could be saved. This makes those arbitrators reluctant to 
even mention settlement to the parties. 
Indeed, whether mentioning settlement facilitation to the parties 
makes sense may well depend on what the parties have been through 
before they have initiated arbitration. If they have already 
unsuccessfully completed several steps of an escalation clause and/or 
tried to mediate the dispute, there is less chance that they will be 
interested in settlement facilitation. In all other cases, there is little 
that speaks against at least mentioning the possibility of settlement to 
the parties. 
B.  Providing an early neutral evaluation 
A technique that is not immediately aimed at bringing about a 
settlement, but often leads to it, is providing an early neutral 
evaluation. In an early neutral evaluation, the arbitral tribunal shares 
its preliminary views on the entire case or individual issues with the 
parties at an early stage of the proceedings. This allows the parties to 
tailor their submissions to what the arbitral tribunal considers the 
crucial points of the case and can thus help to expedite the 
proceedings considerably. In addition, once the parties know the 
arbitral tribunal’s tendency in regard to specific issues, settlement 
efforts are usually more successful as each party is aware of the 
strengths and weaknesses of its case.98 This is reflected in one Swiss 
arbitrator’s approach: 
                                                                                                             
96. See supra note 17. 
97. See supra notes 14-15. 
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I think that it is helpful after the first or second exchange of 
briefs, that you sit together with the parties and that the 
arbitrators—but generally only if the parties agree to it—present 
their preliminary opinions on the basis of the evidence that has so 
far been produced ... I call them preliminary views conferences.99 
This approach has also been adopted in the CEDR Rules. Art. 5 
(1.1) CEDR Rules allows the tribunal to: 
provide all Parties with the Arbitral Tribunal’s preliminary views 
on the issues in dispute in the arbitration and what the Arbitral 
Tribunal considers will be necessary in terms of evidence from 
each Party in order to prevail on those issues.100 
Before the arbitrators provide their preliminary views, it is 
essential to obtain all parties’ consent.101 Under no circumstances may 
the arbitral tribunal’s views be imposed upon a party that, for 
whatever reasons, does not want to hear them. Even with such 
consent, some arbitrators are hesitant to provide an early neutral 
evaluation. For example, Chinese arbitrators, known for their 
traditional sympathy for settlement facilitation, do not provide an 
early evaluation “because they consider that expressing an opinion on 
the outcome would be improper and would put their impartiality in 
jeopardy.”102 Other international arbitrators have similar concerns: 
As one put it, if the arbitrators were to share their preliminary 
opinions on any point of fact or law: “In my view you could 
overturn the award. You can’t indicate that you’ve made up your 
mind until the end of the arbitration.” Another interviewee, a 
former judge, said: “You have to be careful because you don’t 
know enough about the case, you have to do it very cautiously. I 
came closest to it as a judge, and people then say ‘He made up 
his mind against us.’”103 
These concerns about the appearance of bias are overrated. An 
early neutral evaluation does not lead to the arbitrator making up his 
or her mind before the conclusion of the case. Rather, arbitral 
decision-making is a long and continuous process.104 Having 
indicated their preliminary views to the parties at a certain point in 
                                                                                                             
99. KARTON, supra note 3, at 107. 
100. Cf. Art. 2 (3) IBA RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra Part II. 
101. Schneider, supra note 2, at 76. 
102. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 2, at 197. 
103. KARTON, supra note 3, at 106; cf. Gill, supra note 2, at 159. 
104. Schneider, supra note 2, at 76; cf. FROITZHEIM, supra note 21, at 668. 
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time during the proceedings will not deter international arbitrators 
from arriving at diametrically opposed final conclusion in the award 
in case a thorough review of all submissions and evidence so requires. 
Nevertheless, to avoid any appearance of bias, arbitrators should 
expressly reserve their right to reconsider their position and make it 
very clear to the parties that the arbitral tribunal is still open to all 
submissions and views after having provided an early evaluation.105 
In addition, arbitrators should obtain a waiver from each party of its 
right to challenge the impartiality of the arbitrators due to them 
providing an early neutral evaluation if settlement fails and the 
proceedings continue. If these safeguards are in place, there is no 
reason for concern regarding the parties’ due process rights in 
connection with an early neutral evaluation. 
Finally, a practical concern about early neutral evaluation by 
international arbitrators may be that it is too early for the arbitral 
tribunal to have thoroughly reviewed the case file: “the principal risk 
for an arbitrator [providing preliminary views] is not the appearance 
of bias or pre-judgment but the revelation of the arbitrator’s ignorance 
of the [f]ile.”106 Such considerations may well lead some arbitrators 
not to suggest an early neutral evaluation. However, the perceived 
extra-effort of reviewing the case file at an early point in the 
arbitration should not be misunderstood as wasted time if the parties 
do not reach a settlement. Quite to the contrary, an early evaluation of 
the issues at stake is an ideal way to take charge of the process and 
may be critical for streamlining the proceedings and providing a 
bespoke procedure for the individual dispute.107 Thus, if an early 
evaluation does not lead to settlement, it will in any case greatly assist 
the parties and the tribunal to focus on the key issues at stake. 
C.  Conducting a settlement conference 
A measure that is more directly aimed at facilitating settlement 
than an early neutral evaluation is a settlement conference between 
the arbitral tribunal and the parties. Often, such settlement 
conferences are referred to as the “Germanic” approach to facilitating 
                                                                                                             
105. Ehle, supra note 2, at 82; Schneider, supra note 2, at 76. 
106. Schneider, supra note 2, at 76 (quoting Alain Hirsch). 
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settlement.108 Section 32.1 DIS Rules 1998 serves as a proxy for this 
approach.109 It states that “[a]t every stage of the proceedings, the 
arbitral tribunal should seek to encourage an amicable settlement of 
the dispute or of individual issues in dispute.” This provision is rooted 
in Section 278 (1) German Code of Civil Procedure which includes a 
similar provision for state court judges.110 To better understand its 
significance, three points deserve mentioning. First, the reference to 
“every stage of the proceedings” means that it is a continuing task of 
the arbitral tribunal to evaluate the case and propose a settlement 
conference whenever it considers the moment to be right. Second, 
Section 32.1 DIS Rules 1998 is not formulated as an obligation 
(“should” rather than “shall”). It thus makes settlement facilitation a 
nobile officium of the arbitral tribunal, while at the same time 
protecting the arbitrators against the accusation of partiality if they act 
under the provision.111 Finally, that the arbitral tribunal should “seek 
to encourage” settlement means that a settlement conference must not 
be imposed on the parties against their will. Nevertheless, some 
understand this requirement as “empowering the arbitral tribunal to 
present propriu motu its own settlement proposals” without the need 
“to obtain the parties’ approval in advance.”112 That understanding is 
in line with the fact that, in many cases, Section 32.1 DIS Rules 1998 
only reflects the parties’ pre-existing expectations.113 However, there 
will always be parties that are either not familiar with settlement 
conferences or who have their reasons for not wanting them in a given 
case. Thus, before conducting a settlement conference, arbitral 
tribunals must always—and in practice usually do—obtain the 
parties’ express consent to this process, including under Section 32.1 
DIS Rules 1998.114 
In the settlement conference, the arbitral tribunal explores and 
discusses the chances for and the possible content of a settlement 
agreement with the parties in a dialectic and interactive process. 
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Often, the party-appointed arbitrators play an important role in these 
discussions because a party may be more likely to understand (and 
accept) the arguments of the tribunal if they are presented to it by the 
arbitrator it has appointed.115 The ideal result of such a conference is a 
settlement agreement concluded by the parties, either with the 
assistance of the arbitral tribunal or outside the hearing room. 
Significantly, despite their common-law origin, the CEDR Rules 
also adopt this “Germanic” approach in Art. 5 (1): 
Unless otherwise agreed by the Parties in writing, the Arbitral 
Tribunal may, if it considers it helpful to do so, take one or more 
of the following steps to facilitate a settlement of part or all of the 
Parties’ dispute: 
. . . 
1.2. provide all Parties with preliminary non-binding 
findings on law or fact on key issues in the arbitration; 
1.3. where requested by the Parties in writing, offer 
suggested terms of settlement as a basis for further 
negotiation; 
1.4. where requested by the Parties in writing, chair one or 
more settlement meetings attended by representatives of the 
Parties at which possible terms of settlement may be 
negotiated.116 
The main concern about such settlement conferences is that 
arbitrators make themselves vulnerable to challenges. A settlement 
proposal may be regarded as a sign of bias towards one party, as such 
a proposal will usually point out a weakness in at least one party’s 
case.117 However, actual bias because of a participation in settlement 
conferences is very infrequent.118 Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests 
that instances in which parties divulge sensitive information during 
settlement negotiations which they have not presented in their 
submissions are “extremely rare.”119 In any case, this concern can be 
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rebutted by acquiring all parties’ consent before conducting a 
settlement conference. If all parties give their informed consent and 
waive any right to challenge the arbitral tribunal because of its 
participation in a settlement conference, the parties are barred from 
any challenges on these grounds.120 
Under the DIS Rules, such a waiver may be dispensable as the 
existence of Section 32 DIS Rules 1998 already protects the 
arbitrators against any challenges.121 A waiver may also be 
dispensable where the DIS Rules do not apply, but the seat of the 
arbitration is in Germany. Even without an express waiver of the right 
to challenge an arbitrator, German courts have repeatedly denied 
challenges because of an arbitrator’s involvement in a settlement 
conference to which the parties had previously consented: 
The fact that an arbitrator has participated in settlement 
negotiations with the parties and has supported a settlement 
proposal which is far away from the expectations of the party that 
challenges him, does not justify, in and of itself, doubts as to his 
independence and impartiality. Rather, from the perspective of a 
reasonable party, this would be the case only if that party could 
have the legitimate impression that the conduct of the arbitrator is 
based on bias or arbitrariness. If a settlement shall be reached 
during settlement negotiations, the arbitrator must be granted 
considerable leeway for his [or her] own proposals. The 
considerations which the arbitrator makes in such a context must 
not be regarded as final determinations of the legal issues at 
stake, but as mere thought-provoking impulses for the parties’ 
settlement negotiations. If one of the parties discovers errors in 
the tribunal’s arguments and proposals, it may always argue 
against them and reject a settlement based on those arguments or 
proposals and may, through further submissions and motions for 
the taking of evidence, try to make the arbitrators change their 
minds.122 
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In all other cases, the significance of obtaining such a waiver is 
expressed in the official explanation of General Standard 4 (d) of the 
IBA Guidelines on Conflict of Interest 2014: 
[T]he arbitrator should receive an express agreement by the 
parties that acting in such a manner shall not disqualify the 
arbitrator from continuing to serve as arbitrator. Such express 
agreement shall be considered to be an effective waiver of any 
potential conflict of interest that may arise from the arbitrator’s 
participation in such process or from information that the 
arbitrator may learn in the process. If the assistance by the 
arbitrator does not lead to final settlement of the case, the parties 
remain bound by their waiver.123 
Indeed, in light of the ever-increasing number of challenges and 
the misuse of that right by some parties,124  the arbitral tribunal should 
always obtain the parties’ informed consent and waiver of any 
challenges connected to the tribunal’s settlement efforts before it 
conducts a settlement conference. Once this consent and the waiver 
are obtained, there is nothing that would speak against conducting a 
settlement conference.125 
D.  Using mediation techniques, in particular caucusing 
Finally, at the far end of the arbitrator role continuum is the use 
of tools borrowed from mediation.126 The classic example is 
caucusing.127 Caucusing is the most controversial settlement 
facilitation technique on the arbitrator role continuum. As caucusing 
occurs in the arbitration itself, not as a separate Arb-Med or Arb-
Med-Arb process,128 the parties’ due process rights are in full force.129 
Of particular concern in regard to caucusing is the parties’ right to be 
heard. If the arbitral tribunal holds private sessions and listens to what 
one party has to say in the absence of the other, that party may reveal 
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facts to the members of the tribunal the other party is unable to 
rebut.130 Such an ex parte conversation is a textbook example for a 
violation of the right to be heard and usually constitutes a ground to 
vacate the award.131 
Some are of the opinion that this concern can be alleviated by 
obtaining all parties’ consent that caucusing may be conducted: 
Since flexibility is the main advantage of the arbitral process, 
separate meetings with the parties should therefore not be 
definitely ruled out, for example in order to overcome final 
obstacles in the way of a settlement. Any initiative for unilateral 
caucusing during settlement negotiations in which the arbitral 
tribunal participates should come from the parties and all parties 
have to agree on this method.132 
Indeed, if it is true that the parties are free to shape the 
arbitrator’s mandate in any way they see fit,133 why should party 
autonomy not allow them to contract out of their right to be heard and 
validly agree that the arbitral tribunal may conduct caucuses? 
This is where the second prong to the arbitrator’s mandate comes 
into play, namely his or her judicial mandate to safeguard the parties’ 
mandatory due process rights. In light of the paramount importance of 
the parties’ right to be heard as a core due process (or natural justice) 
right, it is doubtful whether state courts would confirm an agreement 
to waive the right to be heard. Indeed, courts have been hesitant in 
allowing parties to waive other due process rights. In the famous 
Dutco case, for instance, the French Cour de Cassation has declared 
that parties cannot waive their right to each select an arbitrator.134 
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Similarly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that mandatory 
provisions, such as the parties’ right to a judicial review of the arbitral 
award in set aside proceedings, cannot be waived by party 
agreement.135 However, both courts have emphasized that this only 
applies to waivers in the parties’ arbitration agreement, i.e. before the 
dispute has arisen. Since the question of caucusing usually only 
comes up in regard to settlement facilitation when the arbitration is 
already on the way, it may be possible for parties to waive their right 
to be heard in that respect and provide their informed consent to 
conduct caucuses. Indeed, when confronted with a specific situation 
in which the arbitral tribunal considers caucusing key to arriving at an 
amicable solution, the parties are in a position to determine the 
specific impact of a waiver of their right to be heard in exchange for 
the increased possibility that they achieve a settlement. 
However, caucusing also raises concerns regarding the 
arbitrator’s impartiality (the second core natural justice requirement). 
It is the purpose of a caucus session that parties feel free to disclose 
information they otherwise would not have revealed. Accordingly, the 
arbitrator will learn facts in caucusing which are not contained in the 
case file of the arbitration.136 In some cases, these facts may indicate a 
different outcome to what the case file would require. While the 
arbitrator will be conscious to ignore all information obtained in 
caucusing when deciding on the merits, there is a non-negligible risk 
that the arbitrator will not be able to entirely exclude these facts from 
his or her intellectual decision-making process.137 This risk alone 
suffices to create the appearance of bias. Therefore, caucusing should 
be avoided even if all parties’ consent has been obtained.138 This is in 
                                                                                                             
135. In re: Wal-Mart Wage and Hour Employment Practices Litigation 737 F.3d 1261 
(9th Cir. 2013). 
136. Raeschke-Kessler, The Arbitrator as Settlement Facilitator, supra note 2, at 525; 
Ehle, supra note 2, at 83; Elsing, Procedural Efficiency in International Arbitration, supra 
note 64, at 118; cf. Gill, supra note 2, at 158–159. 
137. The influence of the unconscious on arbitral decision-making has been discussed to 
a considerable extent. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Behavioral Analysis of Arbitral 
Decision Making, in TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED 
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 319–337 (Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark eds., 2005); 
Lucy Reed, The 2013 Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre Kaplan Lecture: Arbitral 
Decision-Making: Art, Science or Sport?, 30 J. INT’L ARB. 85–99 (2013); Edna Sussman, 
Arbitrator Decision-Making: Unconscious Psychological Influences and What You Can Do 
About Them, 24 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 487–514 (2013); Rebecca K. Helm, Andrew J. Wistrich 
& Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Are Arbitrators Human?, 13 J.  EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 666–692 (2016). 
138. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 2, at 204; Berger, The International Arbitrator’s 
Dilemma, supra note 6, at 224. 
916 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:3 
line with the CEDR Rules which state in Art. 5 (2.1) that “[t]he 
Arbitral Tribunal shall not meet with any Party without all other 
Parties being present.” Fortunately, the prohibition of caucusing does 
not constitute a real threat to the success of arbitrators’ initiatives to 
foster a settlement between the parties as the success rate of the other 
methods on the arbitrator role continuum is already high.139 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
For more than fifty years, there has been a debate whether it is 
appropriate for international arbitrators to facilitate settlement. The 
recent tectonic shift in the dispute resolution landscape towards more 
collaborative methods of ADR suggests that now the time has come 
to put that debate to bed and embrace settlement facilitation as an 
efficient way to end the parties’ dispute. The growing interest in 
resolving disputes amicably puts international arbitrators at a 
crossroads. Either provide what the parties require and offer 
settlement facilitation within the limits of the parties’ legitimate 
expectations and due process rights – or lose them to competitive 
alternatives such as mediation, conciliation and similar collaborative 
methods of ADR. In terms of settlement facilitation, there is no reason 
to bow down and leave the field to these “alternatives to the 
alternative.” While it is true that, first and foremost, it is the 
arbitrator’s mandate to decide the parties’ dispute, that mandate is not 
limited to decision-making. Rather, settlement facilitation has become 
a genuine additional part of the modern arbitrator’s mandate. In line 
with that change, most practitioners have overcome the common 
law/civil law divide. They facilitate settlement where the parties and 
the case so require – regardless of their cultural background and legal 
upbringing. This is reflected in the CEDR Rules which, it is hoped, 
will grow to become the “IBA Rules of Evidence” for settlement 
facilitation by international arbitrators. It is also reflected in a show of 
hands at the Fordham International Arbitration and Mediation 
Conference 2016, which has indicated that a surprising number of 
common law practitioners do see a role for international arbitrators in 
the facilitation of settlement in international arbitration proceedings. 
Today, it seems to be understood that the preferable approach, 
also in this area of international arbitration law, is pragmatic rather 
than dogmatic. The question is not whether arbitrators should or 
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should not facilitate settlement from a conceptual point of view. It is 
how they can best assist the parties to resolve their dispute: either by 
rendering a final award or assisting them in achieving a negotiated 
settlement if and to the extent that they so wish. Hence, techniques to 
facilitate settlement of the dispute should belong to the arsenal of 
every international arbitrator in order to diversify the services which 
the arbitration community is able to provide to its users. 
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